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Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010009-9

TEB 23 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT:

Recommendation of Position to be Taken by the DCI Regarding Draft of February 19, 1951 Proposing Establishment of a Psychological Strategy Board

- 1. The subject paper originated in the Executive Office of the President and proposes the establishment of a Psychological Strategy Board directly under the National Security Council. The mission of the Board under the terms of the paper would be solely related to national strategy and policy in the field of psychological warfare (propaganda).
- 2. It is recommended that the DCI position stress the following points:
 - a. The nature of the threat to our national interests coupled with the character of the necessary U. S. actions and reactions necessitates a staff capable of integrating not only the diplomatic and military aspects of our national security program but those in the field of psychological, economic, scientific and all other aspects of warfare both overt and covert.
 - b. Such a staff should be established under the National Security Council in the form of a National Strategy Board responsible for the formulation of strategic national objectives and broad programs in support of the United States strategic interests as expressed by our foreign policy objectives. This Board would interpret NSC policy statements and would be responsible for coordination of the activity of the various components of our national Government in the pursuance of such policy.
 - c. The National Strategy Board should possess authority to issue broad program directives to departments and agencies of the Government responsible for executing the various aspects of our national security program.
 - d. As a example of the manner in which this Board would function let us look at NSC

This paper contains a statement of U. S. policy prepared by the NSC. The statement has policy implications in the politico economic field, (i.e. The United States should continue to

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make further use of		and economic	resources
to assist in defend	ling		
	This statement	of policy wa	s approved by

the President who directed that it be implemented by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the United States Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State. Yet there is nothing specific enough in the statement of policy to allow any program coordination by State Department that the other agencies are not willing to accept. In other words, at the point of implementation there is in effect a complete abdication of authority. On the other hand, should a National Strategy Board be established, this Board would have the responsibility of preparing broad programs for detailed planning and execution by the various agencies involved.

- d. Such a board would thus fill the above gap by constituting an overall staff for programing United States' national strategy relating to the posture and activity of this country in the pursuance of its national objectives on a world-wide basis.
- e. To confine a National Board such as described in the subject paper solely to the field of psychological warfare would raise issues which inevitably would affect broad political, economic, military and other interests of the Government without having a comparable or appropriate organizational mechanism to handle them.
- 3. The following observations occur:
 - a. It is my opinion that we should go along with the concept of a National Board but that the role of the National Board should be broadened to accord with the above suggestions. Such an arrangement would provide a working board which is

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badly needed to consider the political, military and covert activities of this Government. Overall consideration and coordination is needed because political and military actions in practice frequently merge in such a manner as to be indistinguishable. The foreign policy interests of the United States—our external relations—cannot be divided into areas of precise departmental responsibility.

- b. The organizational arrangements provided in the draft constitute a very poor and weak beginning. They provide a Chairman with no authority. He in turn is provided with a staff of inevitably partisan representatives from the interested departments. This device has not worked either on an intra or inter departmental basis.
- c. It is particularly important at this time in view of the nature of the situation which confronts the United States that a decision be made. It is important that the Board to be created not attempt to duplicate responsibilities placed upon CIA under NSC 10/2. In my opinion, it would not be appropriate at this time for the DCI to raise the question as to whether the ultimate responsibility for conduct of covert operations in support of the United States strategic interests should continue to vest in CIA. I so recommend because the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I understand, intends to recommend in his comment on the draft paper that CIA shall continue to be vested with present responsibilities for covert operations.

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KILBOURNE JOHNSTON
Deputy Assistant Director
for Policy Coordination

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